Introduction
In a book published in 2002, 1 
my central question was whether and to what extent
Russian orientations to Russia's domestic political economy were major predictors of Russian foreign policy perspectives. I found this was the case pertaining to East-West strategic and economic interactions and the intensity with which Russians favored re-unification with Belarus and Ukraine, but not with respect to dispositions concerning Russia's regional goals, its regional security perceptions, or the use of force on Russia's perceptions.
In particular, I argued that those Russians, especially foreign policy elites, who were favorably disposed to a market rather than a planned economy and had attitudes congenial to liberal democracy had more benign views than other Russians about United States foreign and security policy and about East-West economic interdependence. Likewise they were less favorably disposed than other Russians to the prospects of Russia's reunification with Belarus and or the Ukraine.
These findings applied both to foreign policy elites and to mass publics but there were striking differences in the support Russian elites and ordinary citizens manifested for liberal democracy as the term is widely understood in the West. Consistent with results elsewhere, a majority of Russian elites--far more than among mass publics-were found to support liberal democracy. This had the consequence that in their foreign policy orientations Russian elites were more internationalist than the Russian public, both in the everyday meaning of that term and in the more carefully defined sense ascribed it by Eugene Wittkopf in his work on American foreign policy. 2 In the process of addressing the overall theme of the link between orientation to the Russian domestic political economy and foreign policy perspectives, I also found, 3 but did not develop fully, that by the end of the 20 th century a broader issue was arguably an even more frequent statistically significant predictor of Russian elite orientations to foreign policy than was orientation to the domestic political economy. That broader issue was a reprise of the Westernizer-Slavophile divide of the mid-nineteenth century. 4 At the end of the Yeltsin era and the dawn of the twenty-first century it turned out that once again whether Russia should follow the path of the West or, rather, it should pursue its own unique path while taking into account its own putatively unique historical and geographical uniqueness had quite concrete implications for how Russian elites lined up on major foreign policy matters.
This paper assesses the extent to which developmental-path preference and orientation to the domestic political economy continue to be major predictors of Russian elite orientations at mid point in the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Drawing on a fourth wave of Russian foreign policy elites 5 5 All four elite surveys were conducted by ROMIR and directed by Elena Bashkirova. Persons were drawn from the media, the economy (including enterprises where the state did and did not own a major share), academic institutes with strong international connections, both the legislative and executive branches of the government, and the armed forces. Those surveyed were selected positionally and, with minor qualifications, the positions have been constant over the period [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . As the text above indicates, the persons interviewed report diminished political efficacy over time, but it should be stressed that these are nevertheless powerful people who would be thought of as members of the political elite anywhere: heads of directorates in the Presidential administration, ministers, deputy ministers, paper begins by exploring elite preferences concerning Russia's developmental path and whether the distribution of attitudes to Western-type market or liberal democracy among Russian foreign policy elites remains unchanged. The report then considers whether these attitudes continue to play the major predictive role vis-a-vis foreign policy they did at the end of the 1990s. The paper finds that, while elites do not resonate in large numbers to the term "Western democracy,"
there is almost no difference in the distribution among elites of attitudes to the developmental path Russia should take or in the support for core values associated with liberal democracy in the 1999 and 2004 surveys.
In both 1999 and 2004, a slim majority of Russian elites opt for taking a path that responds to Russia's uniqueness rather than choosing to follow a Western path. Likewise, in both years, a substantial majority continue to support the underlying values that are often associated with liberal or market democracy. In particular, the distribution of responses Russian elites gave heads of departments in the government; members of foreign policy committees of the Duma and Federation Council, editors and deputy editors, directors and deputy directors of institutes, owners and CEOs of firms, colonels and above in the armed services. (For full details on the 2004 survey, see the "Methodological Report on Russian Foreign Policy Project" prepared by the ROMIR staff and available from the author. Descriptions of the 1993, 1995 and 1999 samples are to be found in Zimmerman, The Russian People, pp. 20-22.) Thus, if a person from the military or secret police had been brought in by Putin to be the head of a directorate in the Presidential administration he-Russian elites are almost invariably men-might or might not have been one of those interviewed. The reason he was interviewed was because he was a role occupant-a head of directorate in the government, a member of a Duma committee dealing with foreign affairs, an editor or deputy editor of a newspaper, etc. Those classified as elites were persons who by virtue of their occupations suggested a prima facie expectation that they would have substantial potential to affect foreign policy. Given the selection criterion, their responses on foreign policy and security topics may not be representative of what elites in general think about foreign policy. But they were sufficiently representative of the foreign policy elite that we can reasonably draw inferences about foreign policy elite orientations to foreign policy. Since, though, those interviewed were not selected for their attitudes to other key questions, the size of the sample probably is such that for issues such as orientation to democratic values for which the sample was not constructed, those interviewed may be regarded as samples of the Russian national elite in general. For an elaboration, see Zimmerman, The Russian People, pp. 18-30. in 2004 to the items used to construct a typology of orientations to the political economy and the typology itself were nearly identical to those similar elites gave in 1999.
In the second part of this essay, I show that the differences among the distributions of responses to a wide range of foreign policy items by liberal democrats, Westernizers and other Russian foreign policy elites, however, have diminished appreciably. Surprisingly, though, it turns out that this has occurred because the distribution of responses among liberal democratic or Westernizing elites has often remained as in 1999, while the distribution of responses to foreign policy questions among other elites in 2004 either approximates that of liberal democratic elites or, minimally, has moved in that direction.
In this respect, one may speak of a certain homogenization of Russian foreign policy perspectives and a decreased role for orientation to the political economy as a predictor of foreign policy orientations. But when we think more broadly about those who are oriented to building on Western experience--those who are disposed to follow the Western path--and especially about those Westernizers whom we code as having liberal democratic orientations to the Russian political economy, their foreign policy orientations usually distinguish them sharply from other Russian foreign policy elites, most notably, but not only, those who think Russia should follow its own path.
I. Elite Orientations to Russia's Internal Evolution
For good reason, scholarly and journalistic accounts of President Vladimir Putin's first years in office have despaired of the near-term prospects for democracy in Russia. While in formal constitutional terms the Constitution that Boris Yeltsin had introduced in December 1993 was to say the least super-presidential, 6 in practice center and periphery were loosely and asymmetrically coupled, the media including television were largely free, elections were competitive and by and large counted fairly and, while opposition candidates faced obstacles in gaining access to the media, mass publics had a reasonable understanding of the basic policy orientations of , for instance, the presidential candidates in the 1996 and 2000 elections. 7 One would be hard put to find observers who would challenge the proposition that Russia has become more centralized under Putin, even if some would ascribe much of this to Yeltsin's ineptness rather than to Putin's behavior. Lists would vary but most would include the continued failure thus far to develop an effective competitive party system, the limited independence of the judiciary, the diminished role of the Duma, the drastic change in the means of selecting regional governors and the state's domination of the television channels as indicative of movement away, from rather than toward, democracy.
What's more, one can readily infer from mass survey data that support for democracy among mass publics is strikingly low when compared with the overwhelming majority of other European post-communist systems or of states that, like Russia, the OECD codes as mid-level developing countries.
Thus, the most recent round of data-gathering conducted as part of the World Values Survey included 39 mid-level developing countries including Russia. Respondents were asked a battery of questions including:
• Do you feel there is a lot of respect for individual human rights in our country?
• Would you say that [having a democratic system] is a) 1. very good… 4. very bad …way of governing the country? • Whether they agreed that "In a democratic system, the economic system runs badly."
• Whether "Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling."
• Whether "Democracies aren't good at maintaining order."
• Whether democracies have problems but are better than other systems.
The mean response for the Russian survey was the lowest of the 39 mid-level countries surveyed concerning whether a democratic system was a good or bad way to govern a country; the second most likely to agree that the economy runs badly in a democratic system; fourth most likely to assert that democracies are indecisive, second most likely to agree that democracies aren't good at maintaining order, and least likely to agree that democracies have problems but are better than others.
As a result, neither institutional developments nor mass public attitudes have been such as to encourage optimism about the prospects for a democratic Russia. In any assessment of such prospects, however, a major role has to be ascribed to elites, who, after all, virtually by definition play a more central role than do mass publics. The data on which this paper is based are entirely drawn from a sample of elites.
Obviously, therefore, we can not address systematically whether the gap between Russian elites and Russian mass publics in their orientation to the political economy has altered in the read on their role in foreign policy making transfers to domestic policy as well, then their ability to affect outcomes relevant to the long-term prospects for democracy in Russia are more circumscribed than they were in the 1990s. But, as Table 1 and the data reported in the previous paragraph also suggest, some elites and some of the institutions in which these elites operate, continue to play some role, albeit generally diminished, in the policy process.
So, it continues to matter for the long term prospects for democracy in Russia what kind of political system elites consider most suitable for Russia. This question has been asked explicitly of such elites both in 1999 and in 2004.When presented with four options--"the Soviet system before perestroika," "the Soviet system before perestroika but in a more democratic form," "the current system" , and "Western democracy (demokratiia zapadnogo tipa)"-only 29 percent of those who gave some answer in 2004 (and less than a quarter of all respondents) said they thought Western democracy most suitable for Russia (Table 2) . At the same time, the footnote to table 2 is, indeed, noteworthy. When given the choice between "the Soviet system 8 Only a few among the foreign policy elites interviewed have ever said they affected a decision "significantly" or "decisively." The range is from eight percent in 1993 to five percent in 2004. More telling is the decline over time in those who say that they had had "some" effect on a foreign policy decision. More than half (51.3 %, n=81) the respondents in 1993 answered that they had had some effect on a foreign policy decision, slightly less than half in 1995 (46%, n=80), less than a third in 1999 (30%, n= 63) and approximately a quarter (26%, n=70) in 2004.
before perestroika" and "the Soviet system but in a more democratic form" essentially no one (3 of 280 possible answers) among Russian elites in 2004 considered the former Soviet system the one most suitable for contemporary Russia.
Both of these findings-that only a minority favor Western democracy and that essentially no one wants to return to the pre-perestroika era-apparently differ from the results obtained in the 1999 survey of elites. Then, more than three-fifths (61 percent, n=75) of those who answered the question responded that Western democracy (demokratiia zapadnogo tipa) was the political system most suitable for Russia. Slightly less than a quarter (24%, n=29) answered that the old system before perestroika was more suitable, with the balance identifying the present system as the one most suitable for Russia. This would suggest that by 2004 views as to the system most suitable had become less polarized, with the majority of elites believing that the traditional Soviet system in a more democratic guise or the present system is the polity most suitable for Russia.
Observers following Russian developments during the first five years of Vladimir Putin's tenure as President would find this plausible. That being said, it should be stressed that what we are reporting may well be an artifact of the differences between the response categories for this question that were employed in 1999 and in 2004. In 1999, respondents were given three choices: whether they thought the Soviet system before perestroika, the present system, or Western democracy was most suitable. What I had not anticipated in framing the responses in such a way was how much Russian elites wished to have their cake and eat it, too.
In general, Russian elites answer almost all questions. In this instance, though, the framing of the question responses in 1999 generated an enormous number of refused-to-answer or "don't know" responses from elites. Better than two in five respondents (87 of the 210 interviewed) refused to answer the question or said "don't know." By contrast, 15 percent (43 of 280) of the respondents interviewed in 2004 said "don't know" or refused to answer, when given four choices including "the Soviet system before perestroika but in a more democratic form."
Had the same proportion of respondents refused to answer or said "don't know" in 1999
as did in 2004 (15 percent) there would have been an additional 55 respondents giving answers.
If there had been a choice between the previous system and the present system such as "a more democratic Soviet system" and all or almost all the 55 "excess" non-respondents had chosen that Moreover, several considerations may prompt the finding that "Western democracy" is not something a majority of Russian elites favor. The problem might be more with "Western" than with "democracy." Those who embrace beliefs that Western academics or plain people would associate with liberal democracy as it commonly conceived in the West might not assert that Western democracy is the system most suitable to Russia because they have views about how other Russians think about democracy. They may be responding to all the adverse publicity directed against Russian democrats (usually in sarcastic quotation marks) or to widespread assertions that the West is trying to undermine the Russian economy or the Russian state. They may equate Western democracy with a particular orientation to the market. 9 We can sort out somewhat the extent to which those who do not believe Western democracy the political system most suitable for Russia are reacting primarily to "Western" or "democracy" by simple bi-variate analysis. In 1995, 1999, and 2004 elites were asked whether they agreed with those who "believe that Russia should follow the route of the developed countries, integrate into the world community, and profit from the experience of the Western civilization" (Westernizers) or with those who assert that "Taking into account the historical and geographical position of Russia, located at the juncture of Europe and Asia, it should follow its own separate path." (Slavophiles). In all three years a slight majority (56 percent in 1995 and 1999, 54 percent in 2004) answered that Russia should follow its own path. Table 3 cross-tabulates Russian elite responses to the questions about the most suitable Russian political system and whether Russia should emulate the West or follow its own path.
Overwhelmingly, those who assert Russia should take its own path are not disposed to regard Western democracy as the suitable system for Russia. Those who favor Russia taking the path of the West are far more likely to affirm that Western democracy is the system most suitable for Russia. But even among them a majority consider the present system or the Soviet system, but in a more democratic form, the system most suitable for Russia. Similarly, when we examine both the breakdown of respondents who are categorized by a typology I have developed (building on previous work by Charles Lindblom 11 ) pertaining to respondents' orientation to the political economy we draw much the same conclusion. In that scheme, I assert that at the core Russians and others in the post communist world face two choices: between democracy and dictatorship and market and state-controlled obligatory planning. Those who favor markets and democracy I term liberal or market democrats. Those who are more disposed to a planned economy but nevertheless evidence democratic proclivities, I term social democrats. Those who favor market solutions in the economy but evidence an authoritarian impulse get the sobriquet, market authoritarians, while those who are basically Leninists in that they favor both state control of the economy and compulsory planning and who are authoritarians politically are termed socialist authoritarians. I employ nine questions to assess respondents' orientation to the political economy, four dealing with orientation to the economy and five to politics. A simple additive scale 12 was constructed based on how respondents had agreed or disagreed with nine propositions. They were:
11 Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 12 The items were all on a five point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree with "I'm ambivalent (koleibius')" as an intermediate point. Responses were scored from 2 for statements strongly agreeing with a democratic or market-oriented value to -2 for those that were strongly anti-liberal democratic or anti-market. (To account for affirmative set response, those items marked with [R] were included and then reversed in order to construct the scale.) The first four items listed above were used to construct the economic dimension (plan vs. market) of the typology and the last five to construct the political dimension (democracy/dictatorship). Those whose aggregate scores on both the political and economic dimensions were greater than 0 were treated as liberal democrats. Those whose political liberalism score was below 0 but whose economic liberalism score was above 0 were labeled market authoritarians, while those with political liberalism scores above 0 and economic orientation below 0 were termed social democrats. Those scoring below 0 on both dimensions were termed socialist authoritarians. Respondents scoring 0 on either scale were treated as ambivalent and those for whom scores could not be calculated because of the number of times they refused to answer an item were termed 'unmobilized.'
Economy:
• Competition among various enterprises, organizations, and firms benefits our society.
• It's normal when the owner of a prosperous enterprise, using the labor of his workers, becomes richer than many people. • There's no sense in beginning a new business inasmuch as it might fail.[R]
• All heavy industry should belong to the state and not be in private hands.
[R]
Polity:
• Competition among various political parties makes our system strong.
• The rights of the individual should be defended even if guilty persons sometimes remain free.
• In any society it will always be necessary to prohibit the public expression of dangerous ideas [R] • The interests of society should be protected even if innocent people sometimes end up in prison.
[R] • It is apparent that all of the existing philosophies, there is only one that is clearly correct As Table 4 somewhat more disposed to liberal democracy than are those whose preferences are to pursue a separate path; the differences between where they are placed in the typology are not statistically significant (Table 5 ). This is important analytically because as we shall see subsequently it turns out that it makes sense both theoretically and empirically to separate those liberal democrats who are Westernizers and those who advocate following Russia's own unique path.
The same continuity obtains when we examine elite responses to the individual items that make up the typology. As Table 6 demonstrates, the distribution of elite responses to these items was strikingly comparable to the responses for the same items in 1999. Six of the nine items for 2004 were within a single standard error of the same item for 1999, and one within two standard errors.
The two that were not were the item about the gains from competition between parties and the one that referred to free speech. In both instances, respondents were modestly more disposed to views congruent with liberal democracy than were the mean responses for 1999. It did turn out that on roughly half the items, those who favored following a Western path were modestly distinguishable from the 21 st century Slavophiles but these were weak, if statistically significant, In part II of this paper, we consider how preferences concerning the developmental path Russia should take and orientation to the political system shape contemporary Russian foreign policy perspectives on East-West strategic interactions and the links that Russia should have with Belarus and Ukraine.
II. Liberal Democracy, Westernizers, and Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy
As noted at the outset of this paper, in previous work I found that both orientation to the domestic political economy and preferences concerning Russia's developmental path were seen to have independent and statistically significant effects in bivariate and multivariate analysis for Table 7 between the distribution of perspectives on the part of Westernizers and Slavophiles. There remains, as in 1999, a statistically significant difference between Westernizers and Slavophiles in respect to such security matters as whether the US is a threat to Russian security, whether
Russia should balance power vis-a-vis the West, and whether the increase in US power is a great or the greatest threat. Only in the case of responses about NATO intervention is there not a statistically significant difference.
Similarly with respect to Russian ties with Belarus and Ukraine: confronted with scales ranging from the proposition that Russia and Ukraine (Belarus) should be completely independent and one that the countries should be united into a single country, exactly half the Instead, the big story in Table 8 In addition, partitioning the data in this manner indicates that more convergence in perspectives occurred than either Table 7 or 8 intimates. Table 9 repeats the column labeled "others" in Table 8 Exactly how substantial that role is reinforced by multi-variate analysis. Table 10 were also approximately the same. Nevertheless, the case for distinguishing market democrats (undifferentiated) and others in their orientations to foreign policy cannot be made for 2004.
Rather, with the exception of NATO intervention in ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe, developmental path plays a separable role in predicting Russian elite perspectives in the crucial domains of East-West security matters and Russia's relations with Belarus and Ukraine but, among the items included in Table 10 , NATO intervention is the only item for which orientation to the political economy by itself is statistically significant in multi-variate analysis.
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Nor do other usual suspects such as erstwhile membership in the CPSU 16 or age provide substantial purchase in explaining Russian elite perspectives. Some great divides evidently do not disappear; that old chestnut, the Westernizer-Slavophile divide, provides much the same contribution to understanding Russian foreign policy perspectives at the outset of the twenty first century as it did in differentiating attitudes in mid-nineteenth century Russia.
Discussion and Directions for Further Research
Several possible implications emerge from the data presented in this paper. While Rather, it is to the Slavophile-Westernizer divide we must turn in the first instance for an explanation of elite preferences in these domains.
But "in the first instance"merits italicizing. Those we have coded liberal democrats who opt for Russia taking its own path are closer in their foreign policy perspectives to other, nonliberal democratic, elites 17 than they are to their liberal democratic confreres. Those liberal democrats who are oriented to the West in their developmental path preference are people for whom preferences pertaining to Russia's domestic political economy and foreign policy perspectives go hand in hand. As a group they see the West in considerably less threatening terms. Fewer of them wish to merge with Belarus or Ukraine than do elites not liberal democrats or liberal democrats who think Russia should follow its own path.
These findings raise more questions than they answer and suggest some important possible research directions. Why for instance the trend toward homogeneity in perspective across elites with differing orientations to the political economy that is illustrated by Tables 8?   17 The sharpness with which we can distinguish Western oriented and "own path" liberal democrats does not characterize the other foreign policy elites. There are differences to be sure, but among the non-liberal democratic elites, the Westernizer-Slavophile distinction is statistically significant at the .05 or better level with regard to only three of the seven items employed in Tables 7 through 10 that "above all else Russia was, is and will, of course, be a major European power," it seems plausible to assert that elites on both the right and the left have been responding to leadership cues, especially in settings where elements exist in the international environment that provide ancillary evidence of the possibilities for collaboration: US -Russian collaboration on terrorism, for instance.
But it is not clear that the cue taking has extended much beyond that. George Breslauer has pointed out to me in a personal correspondence that in a more hierarchical setting such as In addition, we need to explore the content that hides behind the summary phrases "following the path of the developed countries, bearing in mind the achievements of Western civilization" and "taking its own Russian path." It would be astonishing to learn that what Russian elites have in mind when they opt for one or the other as an overall statement of preferences about the future direction of Russia does not in large part involve ideas about Russia's domestic political economy and its overall political system. In either event, careful 21 Indeed, the responses by the military in 1999 and 2004 were so disparate that I re-analyzed Tables 7 through 9 without the military. While the percentages change, obviously, the patterns do not.
monitoring of a theme in Russian history with a pedigree that extends back at least 150 years will take us a long way in assessing choices Russians make about the direction of contemporary Russian foreign policy. The exact wording for these items and in the tables that follow were: Table 7 . For wording of questions see also Sources: as in Table 7 . For question wording see Table 7 . Sources: as in Table 7 . For exact wording see Table 7 . For comparable figures for 1999, see Zimmerman, The Russian People, p.183.
